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THE UBERIZATION OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES 
By 
Jill I. Gross* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 As the public policy debate over the propriety of mandatory arbitration1 rages on,2 
many companies continue to insert pre-dispute arbitration agreements (PDAAs) into their 
adhesive consumer and employment contracts,3 mandating arbitration of any dispute 
arising out of or relating to the contract.  These clauses often strip the weaker party of its 
right to pursue claims as class or collective actions (class action waivers).4 Companies 
justify their use of these PDAAs on the ground that arbitration is a cheaper and more 
efficient yet fair method of dispute resolution,5 while consumers and employees argue that 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, Elisabeth Haub School of Law, Pace University. I am grateful for the research assistance 
of Emily Rawdon, Pace J.D. Candidate, May 2018. 
1 I define “mandatory” arbitration in this context as arbitration resulting from a predispute arbitration clause 
in an adhesive agreement between parties of unequal bargaining power. 
2 See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American Employers are Using Mandatory Arbitration 
to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1310 (2015) (critiquing employers’ use of 
mandatory arbitration to decrease employees’ access to justice); Alexander J.S. Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration 
and Inequality of Justice in Employment, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71, 90 (2014) (“[R]ather than enhancing 
equality, mandatory arbitration exacerbates inequality in access to justice in the workplace.”); Thomas J. 
Stipanowich, The Arbitration Fairness Index: Using a Public Rating System to Skirt the Legal Logjam and 
Promote Fairer and More Effective Arbitration of Employment and Consumer Disputes, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 985, 
988-91 (2012) (identifying fairness concerns surrounding the growth of mandatory arbitration clauses). 
3 See Arbitration Study: Report to Congress pursuant to Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act § 1028(a), CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU (Mar. 2015), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf (reporting 
data on companies’ use of PDAAs and class action waivers in consumer financial agreements). 
4 See Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses Prevent Consumers from Presenting 
Procedurally Difficult Claims, 42 SW. L. REV. 87, 87-88 (2012); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 704 (2012); David S. Schwartz, Claim-
Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239, 240 (2012); see also Ross v. Am. Express Co., 35 
F. Supp. 3d 407, 415-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (detailing concerted actions, including twenty-eight group meetings 
of issuer banks across the credit card industry, to include PDAAs in customer agreements to suppress 
consumers’ ability to bring class action suits against the industry); see also Nancy A. Welsh & Stephen J. 
Ware, Ross et al. v. American Express et al.: The Story Behind the Spread of Class Action-Barring 
Arbitration Clauses in Credit Card Agreements, 21 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 18 (2014) (detailing findings of the 
Ross court). 
5 See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 257 (2009) (stating that “[p]arties generally favor arbitration 
precisely because of the economics of dispute resolution”). But see Thomas J. Stipanowich & J. Ryan Lamare, 
Living with ADR: Evolving Perceptions and Use of Mediation, Arbitration and Conflict Management in 
Fortune 1000 Corporations, 19 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2014) (identifying at least 14 different reasons 
why parties choose to arbitrate). 
they are forced into an unfair dispute resolution forum tilted in favor of repeat player 
corporations with superior bargaining power.6   
Uber Technologies, Inc. (Uber), founded in March 2009 and headquartered in San 
Francisco, California,7 finds itself a “gig economy”8 company smack in the middle of this 
debate. To make transportation more efficient and reliable around the world,9 Uber 
develops, markets and operates the Uber app, which allows individuals with 
smartphones to submit a transportation request. The app then sends the request to one of 
Uber’s subsidiaries, also known as “third party Transportation Companies,” which, in turn, 
forwards the request to the Uber driver nearest to the requester, alerting the driver to the 
location of the customer.10 The driver can then accept the request and pick up the rider. 
The Uber app automatically calculates the fare, charges the rider’s credit card pre-linked 
to the account, and transfers payment to the driver.11  
Since its official launch in San Francisco in July 2010, Uber has experienced rapid 
and explosive worldwide growth.  By May 2011, it offered its service in New York City, 
started expanding internationally in December 2011, and by early 2017, operated in 545 
cities in 66 countries around the world.12 All during this operating expansion, the company 
                                                 
6 See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2015, at A1; Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. 
L. REV. 1631, 1650-51 (2005) (“Whereas a given company will tend to arbitrate many consumer disputes, a 
given consumer or employee will typically arbitrate, at most, one. Thus, the companies have far greater 
experience with and exposure to the arbitration process than do the consumers or employees. There is some 
limited empirical evidence that the repeat player does somewhat better in arbitration than the nonrepeat 
player.”); Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y 
J. 189, 190-91 (1997). 
7 See Company Overview of Uber Technologies, Inc., BLOOMBERG,  
http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapid=144524848 (last visited Feb. 9, 
2017). Uber was launched in March 2009 as UberCab, but shortened its name to Uber in October 2010 a few 
days after local taxi regulators issued cease and desist notices to Uber for, inter alia, operating a taxi service 
without a license.  See Ryan Graves, Uber has been served, NEWSROOM (Oct. 25, 2010), 
https://newsroom.uber.com/uber-has-been-served/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2016). 
8 “The gig economy is the collection of markets that match providers to consumers on a gig (or job) basis in 
support of on-demand commerce.” Sarah A. Dononvan, David H. Bradley, and Jon O. Shimabukuro, What 
Does the Gig Economy Mean for Workers?, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44365, at Summary (Feb. 5, 2016), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44365.pdf. The gig economy is sometimes referred to as the “sharing 
economy.”   
9
 See Maya Kosoff, The vision Uber’s CEO has for his $50 billion company suggests the startup is only 
beginning to scratch the surface, BUSINESS INSIDER (June 4, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/travis-
kalanicks-vision-for-uber-2015-6. In addition, the term “Uberize” has come to mean “to modify a market or 
economic model by the introduction of a cheap and efficient alternative.” See WIKTIONARY (June 17, 2016), 
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/uberize (last visited Feb. 26, 2017). 
10 See Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., Civ. No. 16-573, 2016 WL 3960556, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 2016). 
11 Id. 
12 See Uber (company), WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uber_(company). 
raised hundreds of millions of dollars from private investors and in January 2017 was 
valued at $68 billion.13 
As a transportation industry “disrupter”14 rapidly rolling out aggressive expansion 
plans, Uber also has been sued in court more than any other “gig economy” company.15 
Many of those lawsuits were filed as putative class actions. Uber drivers filed the first class 
action lawsuit against the company in 2012;16 by early 2017, both Uber drivers and 
passengers had filed dozens of class actions against Uber. In these lawsuits, 
riders/passengers have alleged primarily three types of claims against Uber: (1) 
misrepresentations and omissions regarding safety measures, background checks, and 
other efforts it takes to provide safety for its customers;17 (2) antitrust violations in the form 
of a price-fixing conspiracy through its pricing algorithms;18 and (3) overcharging or 
charging fictitious fees.19 Drivers have alleged primarily three types of claims against Uber: 
(1) classification of drivers as independent contractors rather than employees in violation 
of applicable labor laws;20 (2) wrongfully depriving drivers of gratuities or other types of 
                                                 
13 See Madeline Johnson, Will Uber be the hottest IPO of 2017?, ZACKS (Jan. 9, 2017), 
https://www.zacks.com/stock/news/244845/will-uber-be-the-hottest-ipo-of-2017 (last visited Feb. 26, 2017). 
14 A disrupter challenges and attempts to radically change the way an industry traditionally does business. 
See Charlotte Rogers, What does it mean to be a disruptor?, MARKETING WEEK (Sept. 28, 2016), 
https://www.marketingweek.com/2016/09/28/what-does-it-mean-to-be-a-disruptor/ (last visited Feb. 26, 
2017). 
15 See Kristen V. Brown, Uber is facing a staggering number of lawsuits, FUSION (Jan. 25, 2016), 
http://fusion.net/story/257423/everyone-is-suing-uber/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2017) (reporting more than fifty 
lawsuits filed in federal court against Uber in 2015 alone).  In fact, Uber has been sued more than any other 
United States start-up company valued at $10 billion or more. See Kristen V. Brown, Here’s what’s going 
on with all of those Uber lawsuits, FUSION (June 16, 2016), http://fusion.net/story/315350/uber-class-action-
lawsuit-settlement/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2017). 
16 See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2014 WL 1760314, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 
2014) (citing to Ehret v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 14–cv–0113–EMC (N.D. Cal.), a class action originally 
filed by Uber drivers in 2012 in Illinois state court which was dismissed and re-filed in federal district court, 
and which similarly alleged that Uber misrepresented to riders the amount of gratuity it paid its drivers). 
17 See Philliben v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 14-CV-05615-JST, 2016 WL 4537912 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2016). 
18 See Meyer v. Kalanick, 200 F. Supp. 3d 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
19 See Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CV 14-14750-DPW, 2016 WL 3751652 (D. Mass. July 11, 2016) 
(alleging Uber overcharged a putative class of riders for travel in Boston area by imposing fictitious fees 
hidden in charges for legitimate local tolls); Tadepalli v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 15-CV-04348-MEJ, 2016 
WL 1622881 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2016) (fictitious fees); Ehret v. Uber Techs., Inc., 148 F. Supp. 3d 884, 889 
(N.D. Cal. 2015) (certifying class in suit alleging false misrepresentations regarding gratuities). 
20 See, e.g., Singh v. Uber Techs. Inc., No. CV 16-3044 (FLW), 2017 WL 396545 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2017); 
Richemond v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-CV-23267, 2017 WL 416123 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2017); Gunn v. 
Uber Techs., Inc., No. 116CV01668SEBMJD, 2017 WL 386816 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 27, 2017); Scroggins v. Uber 
Techs., Inc., No. 116CV01419SEBMJD, 2017 WL 373299 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 26, 2017); Zawada v. Uber Techs., 
Inc., No. 16-CV-11334, 2016 WL 7439198 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 27, 2016) (appeal filed); Razak v. Uber Techs., 
Inc., No. CV 16-573, 2016 WL 7241795 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2016); Marc v. Uber Techs., No. 
compensation;21 and (3) improperly using background checks in its hiring and firing 
decisions.22 Finally, both drivers and riders brought class actions alleging Uber sent 
unsolicited text messages in violation of the Federal Consumer Protection Act.23  
Not long after the first few of those class actions were filed, and following a series 
of rulings by the United States Supreme Court strictly enforcing adhesive arbitration 
clauses with class action waivers,24 in May 2013 Uber inserted a PDAA with a class and 
collective action waiver in agreements with its drivers and riders. Uber’s legal maneuver 
generated dozens of challenges to its PDAA in oppositions to Uber’s motions to compel 
arbitration it filed in the class action lawsuits across the country, and thus dozens of court 
decisions contributing to modern Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) jurisprudence.25 Indeed, 
as of spring 2017, more than 140 federal and state court opinions in which Uber is a 
defendant have been reported on Westlaw. About half of those rule on an issue involving 
the application of the FAA stemming from Uber’s motions to compel.26 
This article explores those decisions, which offer a window into one company’s use 
of a forced pre-dispute arbitration clause with a class action waiver. The article first briefly 
lays out current federal arbitration law, highlighting three critical and recent Supreme Court 
cases relevant to Uber’s PDAA. Part III then describes Uber’s use of a PDAA against this 
landscape and how that use differed for Uber drivers as compared to Uber passengers. Part 
IV explores a few of the more prominent class actions against Uber, and the arbitration-
related opinions they generated. Part V extracts some lessons from how courts reacted to 
the multitude and variety of challenges to Uber’s PDAA. The article concludes by noting 
that UBER’s rapid and worldwide development of a cheaper and more efficient yet 
controversial mode of transportation parallels the growth in companies’ “Uberization” of 
                                                 
216CV579FTM99MRM, 2016 WL 7210886, (M.D. Fla. Dec. 13, 2016); O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 
13-CV-032826-EMC, 2016 WL 4398271 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2016); Rimel v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 
615CV2191ORL41KRS, 2016 WL 6246812 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2016). 
21 See, e.g., Congdon v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-CV-02499-YGR, 2016 WL 7157854 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 
2016); Micheletti v. Uber Techs, Inc., No. CV 15-1001, __ F. Supp.3d __, 2016 WL 5793799 (W.D. Tex. 
Oct. 3, 2016); Lee v. Uber Techs., No. 15 C 11756, 2016 WL 5417215 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2016). 
22 See Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 848 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2016). 
23 See In re: Uber Techs., Inc., Tel. Consumer Prot. Act (Tcpa) Litig., No. MDL 2733, 2016 WL 5846034 
(U.S. Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. Oct. 3, 2016) (denying plaintiffs’ motion to centralize litigation—eight actions 
pending in five districts—in the Northern District of Illinois all alleging that Uber violated the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act by sending unsolicited text messages to plaintiffs' wireless telephones without their 
prior express consent or after they revoked consent, using an automatic telephone dialing system). 
24 See discussion infra Part II, notes 43-50 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra Parts III and IV. 
26 See discussion infra Parts III and IV (plaintiffs in these cases argued that, inter alia, a clause delegating to 
the arbitrator the power to decide questions of arbitrability was unconscionable and thus challenges to 
arbitrability should be heard by courts; the arbitration clause itself was unconscionable; or that the parties did 
not enter into a valid agreement to arbitrate due to lack of mutual assent). 
arbitration clauses, designed to facilitate a cheaper and more efficient yet controversial 
mode of resolving disputes. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND ARBITRATION  
Since the 1980s, the Supreme Court has interpreted section two of the FAA27—
which declares the validity, irrevocability, and enforceability of arbitration agreements—
to reflect a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.”28 The Court has held 
that (1) lower courts must apply a presumption of arbitrability when deciding challenges 
to arbitrability;29 (2) the FAA applies in state and federal court to arbitration clauses in all 
agreements “involving commerce”;30 (3) the FAA preempts conflicting state law;31 and (4) 
federal statutory claims are arbitrable as a matter of public policy unless Congress 
explicitly states they are not.32  
In the early part of this decade, the Court continued this trend of strictly enforcing 
PDAAs. Three decisions in particular, all authored by Justice Scalia, removed legal 
obstacles to companies like Uber seeking to compel arbitration of all disputes arising 
between parties—including arbitrability disputes33—and seeking to enforce class action 
                                                 
27 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 
28 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
29 Id. at 24-25. 
30 By its terms, the FAA governs agreements to arbitrate “transactions involving commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 2 
(2012). The Supreme Court has interpreted this phrase broadly to include any transaction that in fact involves 
interstate commerce, even if the parties did not anticipate an interstate impact. See Allied-Bruce Terminix 
Cos., v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-74, 281 (1995). 
 
31 Under the FAA preemption doctrine, the FAA preempts any state law that “actually conflicts with federal 
law—that is, to the extent that it ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress.’” Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 
489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); see also Doctor’s Assocs., 
Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996) (preempting Montana statute requiring specific type of notice in 
contract containing arbitration clause); Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 272-73 (preempting Alabama statute 
invalidating PDAAs in consumer contracts); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1987) (preempting California 
statute requiring wage collection actions to be resolved in court). 
 
32 See CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012) (federal statutory rights are arbitrable 
absent a “contrary Congressional command”). 
33 See Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010). “Arbitrability” refers to whether a particular 
dispute can, as a legal matter, be resolved through arbitration. 
waivers.34 These decisions, discussed below, have had the cumulative effect of eliminating 
virtually all defenses to arbitrability and converting PDAAs into “super contracts.”35 
First, in 2010, the Court enforced a “delegation provision”36 in a contract delegating 
arbitrability decisions to arbitrators.37 In that case, in response to an employer’s motion to 
compel arbitration of an employment discrimination action, the employee challenged the 
arbitrability of the discrimination dispute (the merits dispute) on the grounds that the 
arbitration agreement was procedurally and substantively unconscionable.38 At that time, 
it was well-settled that courts, not arbitrators, decide challenges to the substantive 
arbitrability of a dispute “’unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide 
otherwise.’”39  
Jackson conceded that the delegation provision was clear and unmistakable but 
claimed that his assent was not valid because it was the product of unconscionability.40 
However, the Court treated the delegation provision as an agreement to arbitrate 
arbitrability disputes separable41 from the agreement to arbitrate merits disputes. Because 
                                                 
34 See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 
131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
35 See Jill I. Gross, Justice Scalia's Hat Trick and the Supreme Court’s Flawed Understanding of Twenty-
First Century Arbitration, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 111, 124 (2015); Richard Frankel, The Arbitration Clause as 
Super Contract, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 531, 533 (2014); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New 
Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 9 (2010) (“In the twentieth century, pre-dispute (or ‘executory’) 
arbitration agreements evolved from disfavored status to judicially denominated ‘super-clauses.’”). 
36 The Court defined a “delegation provision” as “an agreement to arbitrate threshold issues concerning the 
arbitration agreement.” Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 68.  
37 Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 68 (the delegation provision stated that “[t]he Arbitrator, and not any federal, 
state, or local court or agency, shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, 
applicability, enforceability or formation of this Agreement including, but not limited to any claim that all or 
any part of this Agreement is void or voidable.”). 
38 Id. at 65-66. Jackson did not argue that the delegation provision, standing alone, was unconscionable. Id. 
at 72-73. 
39 Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S 79, 83 (2002) (citing AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns 
Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)). Most federal courts considering the issue hold that the incorporation by 
reference of an arbitration forum’s rules that empower arbitrators to decide substantive arbitrability 
constitutes such “clear and unmistakable evidence.” See, e.g., Eckert/Wordell Architects, Inc. v FJM 
Properties of Willmar LLC, 756 F.3d 1098, 1100 (8th Cir. 2014) (AAA rules); Brennan v. Opus Bank, 796 
F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2015) (same). But see Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, 809 
F.3d 746 (3d Cir. 2016) (incorporation of AAA rules is not “clear and unmistakable” evidence parties 
intended to delegate issue of class arbitrability to arbitrators). 
40 Jackson, 561 U.S. at 69, n.1. 
41 Under the separability doctrine, valid agreements to arbitrate are separable from their underlying 
agreements and an arbitrator decides the enforceability of the underlying agreement absent “clear and 
unmistakable evidence” that the parties wanted a court to decide questions of arbitrability. See First Options 
the employee challenged as unconscionable the underlying agreement to arbitrate merits 
disputes (as opposed to the delegation provision), the Court found that the delegation 
provision was valid and enforceable.42 As a result, arbitrators would decide whether the 
arbitration clause itself was unconscionable.  
The following year, the Court enforced a class action waiver in a PDAA, thus 
compelling individual arbitration of plaintiffs’ claims of fraud arising out of their purchase 
of a cell phone.43 The Court ruled that the FAA preempts California’s Discover Bank rule, 
which “classif[ied] most collective-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as 
unconscionable,”44 because the rule treated adhesive arbitration clauses with a class action 
waiver differently than non-arbitration contracts. 
Finally, in 2013, the Court ruled that arbitration clauses were enforceable even if 
one party could not, as a practical matter, vindicate its rights in arbitration.45 In Italian 
Colors, a group of merchants accepting American Express charge cards sued American 
Express in federal court for federal antitrust violations. The parties’ agreement contained a 
PDAA and a class action waiver.46 Opposing defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, the 
merchants challenged the enforceability of the class action waiver, arguing that, if they 
could not proceed as a class, they had no financially feasible means of pursuing their 
antitrust claims.47 The Second Circuit refused to enforce the class action waiver, finding 
that the cost of individual arbitration precluded plaintiff merchants from vindicating their 
statutory rights.48  
The Court reversed, finding that “the fact that it is not worth the expense involved 
in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that 
                                                 
of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 
U.S. 395, 402-03 (1967). 
42 Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 71-72. 
43 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). Plaintiffs Vincent and Liza Concepcion 
accepted an AT&T Mobility offer for a free cell phone. When they discovered they were charged $30.22 in 
sales tax, the Concepcions sued AT&T Mobility in federal district court on behalf of a class of similarly situated 
consumers, alleging that AT&T Mobility’s “practice of charging sales tax on a cell phone advertised as ‘free’ 
was fraudulent.” Id. at 1746. 
44 Id. In Discover Bank v. Superior Court of L.A., 113 P.3d 1100, 1103 (Cal. 2005), overruled by AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 342 (2011), the California Supreme Court applied California’s 
unconscionability law to void class action waivers in arbitration agreements. 
45 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
46 Id. at 2308. 
47 An expert estimated that if the allegations were proven, an individual plaintiff’s maximum recovery would 
be $12,850 (see Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2308), an amount that would have been dwarfed by extensive 
discovery and expert witness costs.  
 
48 See In re Am. Express Merch. Litig., 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. 
Ct. 2304 (2013). 
remedy.”49 Though the Court recognized in dicta the effective vindication exception,50 it 
concluded that the exception did not apply to that case. Because the class action waiver in 
the merchants’ charge card service agreements with American Express did not eliminate 
plaintiffs’ right to pursue (only their ability to pursue) their claims under the antitrust laws, 
the waiver was enforceable.   
By limiting the vindicating rights doctrine to the narrow situation where an 
arbitration clause strips a party of the right to prove its case, or where forum fees are “so 
high as to make access to the forum impracticable,”51 the Court sharply narrowed that 
defense to arbitrability—even though other costs might make it unfeasible for the party to 
pursue the case. Combined with Rent-A-Center and Concepcion, Italian Colors sends a 
strong message to companies that PDAAs with class action waivers in adhesive contracts 
as well as delegation clauses were enforceable against virtually all challenges.52 
III. CLASS ACTIONS BY RIDERS 
Against this landscape of Supreme Court FAA jurisprudence, Uber, not 
surprisingly, first utilized a PDAA in May 2013, when it inserted one in a revised 
agreement with passengers.53 Uber’s PDAA included an agreement broad in scope to 
resolve “any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or relating to this Agreement or 
the breach, termination, enforcement, interpretation or validity thereof or the use of the 
Service or Application.”54 The PDAA further provided that the arbitration would be 
                                                 
49 Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2311. 
 
50 Id. at 2310-11. Under the then-existing “effective vindication” doctrine, an arbitration agreement is 
unenforceable if an unfair aspect of the arbitration process precludes the party from vindicating its federal 
statutory rights.  See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985) 
(“[S]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral 
forum, the [federal] statute [providing that cause of action] will continue to serve both its remedial and 
deterrent function”); see also Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000) (implying, in 
dicta, that if a party showed that pursuing its statutory claims through arbitration would be prohibitively 
expensive, and thus it could not vindicate its statutory rights, a court could validly refuse to enforce a PDAA). 
 
51 Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2311. 
52 See Gross, supra note 35, at 132. 
53 Perhaps it did so in response to one of the first class actions it faced: a lawsuit filed by riders in state court 
in Illinois alleging that Uber misrepresented to riders the amount of gratuity it paid its drivers. See Ehret v. 
Uber Techs., Inc., C.A. No. 12CH36714 (Cir. Ct.  Cook Co.); see also O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 
C-13-3826 EMC, 2014 WL 1760314, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2014) (reporting that the Illinois court 
dismissed the Ehret lawsuit based on a choice of forum clause and that the class of riders refiled the case in 
U.S. district court for the Northern District of California styled as Ehret v. Uber, Technologies, Inc., 14–cv–
0113–EMC). 
54 The clause provided:  
Dispute Resolution.  You and Company agree that any dispute, claim or controversy 
arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach, termination, enforcement, 
interpretation or validity thereof or the use of the Service or Application (collectively, 
administered by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) in accordance with its 
Commercial Arbitration Rules and its Supplementary Procedures for Consumer Disputes. 
The arbitration clause also included a waiver of the right to bring class, collective and 
representative actions, and carved out from its scope any individual claim that could be 
brought in a small claims court. Uber also agreed to pay “arbitration-related fees” for any 
rider’s claim under $75,000.55 No ability to opt out of the PDAA was offered;56 if a 
passenger wanted to download the Uber app after that date or continue to use a pre-existing 
account, the passenger had to agree to the PDAA. 
Riders seeking to pursue their claims as class actions have resisted Uber’s motions 
to compel individual arbitration on one primary ground: they did not agree to arbitrate any 
claim with Uber because they did not manifest assent to the agreement containing the 
clause–Uber’s Terms and Conditions (“TAC”).57 Thus far, most courts considering this 
argument have rejected it, concluding that Uber’s TAC is a valid “sign-in wrap” agreement. 
For example, in Cullinane v. Uber Technologies, plaintiffs filed a putative class action in 
federal district court in the District of Massachusetts, alleging that Uber “overcharged them 
for travel to and from Boston Logan Airport and East Boston by imposing fictitious fees 
hidden in charges for legitimate local tolls” in violation of Massachusetts law.58  
Uber moved to compel arbitration, invoking the rider PDAA.59 Plaintiffs opposed 
on the ground that they did not enter into a valid agreement to arbitrate disputes with Uber, 
                                                 
“Disputes”) will be settled by binding arbitration, except that each party retains the right 
to bring an individual action in small claims court and the right to seek injunctive or other 
equitable relief in a court of competent jurisdiction to prevent the actual or threatened 
infringement, misappropriation or violation of a party's copyrights, trademarks, trade 
secrets, patents or other intellectual property rights. You acknowledge and agree that you 
and Company are each waiving the right to a trial by jury or to participate as a 
plaintiff or class User in any purported class action or representative proceeding. 
Further, unless both you and Company otherwise agree in writing, the arbitrator may not 
consolidate more than one person's claims, and may not otherwise preside over any form 
of any class or representative proceeding. If this specific paragraph is held unenforceable, 
then the entirety of this “Dispute Resolution” section will be deemed void. Except as 
provided in the preceding sentence, this “Dispute Resolution” section will survive any 
termination of this Agreement. 
Meyer v. Kalanick, 200 F. Supp. 3d 408, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (emphasis in original). 
55 Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CV 14-14750-DPW, 2016 WL 3751652, at *3 (D. Mass. July 11, 2016). 
56 Id. at *6. 
57 It is well-settled that parties seeking to enforce a PDAA must first establish that a valid agreement to 
arbitrate exists. See Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) (explaining that, on a 
motion to compel arbitration, the court “’shall’” order arbitration “’upon being satisfied that the making of 
the agreement for arbitration…is not in issue’”) (quoting from FAA § 4). 
58 Cullinane, 2016 WL 3751652, at *1. 
59 Id. 
as they could open an account without ever reading the arbitration clause contained in the 
TAC.60   
 
Interestingly, Judge Douglas Woodlock’s opinion ruling on the motion started by 
announcing his general disagreement with FAA jurisprudence: 
 
The practice of avoiding consumer class action litigation through the use of 
arbitration agreements is the subject of current scholarly disapproval and 
skeptical investigative journalism. … Nevertheless, the legal foundation 
provided in Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the Federal Arbitration 
Act for construction of arbitration agreements that bar consumer class 
actions is firmly embedded. Even Justices who question the practice find 
themselves bound to adhere to the blueprint opinions the Court has 
provided. 
 
The plaintiff in this case extends an invitation to disassemble the judicial 
construct permitting a bar to class action litigation for consumer arbitration 
agreements. The invitation suggests teasing out distinctions that truly make 
no difference. This is not an institutionally authorized nor intellectually 
honest way to change practice and legal policy regarding the permissible 
scope of arbitration. Change, if it is to come, must be effected by a 
refinement through legislation and/or regulation that imposes restrictions on 
arbitration agreements, or by a reversal of direction on the part of the 
Supreme Court. It is not within the writ of the lower courts to replot the 
contours of arbitration law when the metes and bounds have been set 
clearly, unambiguously and recently by the Supreme Court.61  
 
After its philosophical pronouncement, the Cullinane court described in detail the 
process for a passenger to sign up for an Uber account through an Apple iPhone app.62 On 
the app, passengers navigated through a three-step process, each with its own screen.63 The 
first two screens required the rider to enter personal information, create a password, and 
create a profile including an uploaded photograph to enable the driver to identify the rider 
at pickup.64 The third screen required the user to enter credit card information so as to allow 
Uber to automatically charge the rider for completed Uber rides. As described by one court, 
                                                 
60 Cullinane, 2016 WL 3751652, at *7. Under applicable Massachusetts law, a so-called “clickwrap” 
agreement is enforceable only if plaintiffs had “reasonable notice” of the arbitration clause. Id. 
61 Id. at *1 (internal citations omitted).  
62 According to the Complaint, the named plaintiffs created their Uber accounts via an iPhone. Complaint at 
¶¶ 11-12, Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CV 14-14750-DPW (D. Mass. July 11, 2016), 2016 WL 
3751652. 
63 Cullinane, 2016 WL 3751652, at *2-3. 
64 Id.  
“[i]mmediately below the credit card information input box, and above the keyboard, 
appear the [key phrase], ‘By creating an Uber account, you agree to the Terms of Service 
& Privacy Policy.’”65 Those words “appear in bold white lettering on a black background, 
and are surrounded by a gray box, indicating a button. The other words are in gray lettering. 
If a user clicks the button that says ‘Terms of Service & Privacy Policy,’ the Terms of 
Service then in effect are displayed on the phone.”66  Those Terms of Service included an 
arbitration clause (on page 9), as described above, under the heading “Dispute Resolution.”   
Once the rider entered payment information, the rider clicked the button “Done” in 
the top-right-hand corner of the screen to complete account creation.67 A rider did not have 
to click on the hyperlink or read the language of the TAC in order to create or continue 
using the account.   
The court then turned to the legal issue of whether, under those circumstances, an 
agreement to arbitrate had been formed. Ultimately, applying Massachusetts law, the court 
ruled that the parties had mutually assented to the arbitration clause because the “process 
through which the plaintiffs established their accounts put them on reasonable notice that 
their affirmative act of signing up also bound them to Uber’s Agreement.”68 Judge 
Woodlock noted that the key phrase of the agreement on the final registration screen “is 
prominent enough to put a reasonable user on notice of the terms of the [account 
a]greement.”69 Because the final screen mentioned that terms and conditions existed, the 
passenger agreed to be bound by the hyperlinked terms by proceeding further even without 
clicking on the hyperlink.70 Other federal district courts have similarly concluded that 
passengers opening an Uber account have entered into a valid agreement with Uber by 
clicking on the on-line “Done” button.71 
In contrast, in Meyer v. Kalanick, Judge Jed Rakoff in the Southern District of New 
York addressed the same issue and reached the opposite conclusion.72 Spencer Meyer, on 
behalf of a class of plaintiffs, sued Uber and its CEO, Travis Kalanick, alleging that 
                                                 
65 Cullinane, 2016 WL 3751652, at *2. 
66 Id. (internal and factual citations omitted). 
67 Id. 
68 Cullinane, 2016 WL 3751652, at *7. 
69 Id. 
70 The Cullinane court then dismissed plaintiffs’ remaining challenges to the arbitration clause itself.  The 
court reasoned that, because the TAC incorporated by reference the AAA Commercial Arbitraiton Rules, and 
those rules empower the arbitrator to decide questions of arbitrability, the arbitrator must decide plaintiffs’ 
remaining contentions.  Id. at *8-9. 
71 E.g., Cubria v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. A-16-CA-544-SS, 2017 WL 1034731, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 
2017) (“The process through which Plaintiff established her account with Uber put her on reasonable notice 
that the act of signing up for Uber's services bound her to the 2013 [Terms and Conditions]”); Cordas v. Uber 
Techs., Inc., No. 16-CV-04065-RS, 2017 WL 658847, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2017).  
72 Meyer v. Kalanick, 200 F. Supp. 3d 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
Kalanick had “orchestrated and participated in an antitrust conspiracy arising from the 
algorithm that co-defendant Uber [] uses to set ride prices.”73 In response to Uber’s motion 
to compel arbitration of the lawsuit, plaintiffs argued that they did not enter into a valid 
arbitration agreement for lack of mutual assent.  
Perhaps as a direct rebuttal to Judge Woodlock’s opening paragraphs in Cullinane, 
Judge Rakoff similarly began his opinion in a broad, philosophical manner:  
 
Since the late eighteenth century, the Constitution of the United States and 
the constitutions or laws of the several states have guaranteed U.S. citizens 
the right to a jury trial. This most precious and fundamental right can be 
waived only if the waiver is knowing and voluntary, with the courts 
“indulg[ing] every reasonable presumption against waiver.”74  
  
Following this bold reminder of the fundamental right to a jury trial, Judge Rakoff 
first decided that California law applied, and outlined the law on the enforceability of 
clickwrap agreements.   
The district court then evaluated the October 2014 version of Uber’s passenger 
TAC, and concluded that the parties did not enter into a valid agreement. As described by 
Judge Rakoff, the process for signing up for an Uber account was virtually identical to the 
process described by Judge Woodlock in Cullinane,75 absent one critical distinction: the 
named plaintiffs in Meyer created their accounts on a Samsung Galaxy smartphone which 
used an Android operating system, unlike the named plaintiffs in Cullinane who created 
their accounts on an iPhone which uses the iOS operating system.76  
Apparently, as a result of the use of different operating systems, the critical 
language on the final screen differed in appearance from the language and design seen by 
the Cullinane plaintiffs.77 As described by Judge Rakoff, the words, “[b]y creating an Uber 
account, you agree to the Terms of Service & Privacy Policy,” was “in considerably smaller 
font” than the language above it, was not in all-caps or otherwise emphasized or 
highlighted, and, “indeed, are barely legible.”78  
Judge Rakoff expressly distinguished Culliname on the grounds that the key phrase 
of agreement in that case was more prominent than the one Judge Rakoff examined, as it 
was “clearly delineated, and the words appeared in bold white lettering on a black 
                                                 
73 Meyer, 200 F. Supp. 3d at 411. 
74 Id. at 410. 
75 One noncritical difference was that the process described by Judge Rakoff involved two steps, not three.  
However, the final screen in both Meyer and Cullinane is the screen at issue in both cases. 
76 Meyer, 200 F. Supp. 3d at 414; see also Complaint at ¶¶ 11-12, Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CV 14-
14750-DPW (D. Mass. July 11, 2016), 2016 WL 3751652. 
77 Meyer, 200 F. Supp. 3d at 418.  
78 Id. at 414.  The language was hyperlinked, blue and underlined. Id. 
background.”79 In contrast, the key phrase Judge Rakoff examined was in a smaller font 
and “more obscure.”80 Accordingly, the district court concluded that “plaintiff Meyer did 
not have ‘[r]easonably conspicuous notice’ of Uber’s User Agreement, including its 
arbitration clause, or evince ‘unambiguous manifestation of asset to those terms.’”81  
After the Meyer decision, in November of 2016, Uber revised its agreement with 
riders to add a delegation clause delegating substantive arbitrability decisions to an 
arbitrator, and to move the bold warning and entire PDAA up to the top of the “Terms and 
Conditions.”82 This move is designed to foreclose future arbitratability challenges from 
being heard in court. It also appears that Uber updated its passenger app so that the critical 
language (“[b]y continuing, I confirm that I have read and agree to the Terms and 
Conditions and Privacy Policy”) appears exactly the same on an iPhone and an Android 
phone.83 Thus, it seems that Uber has learned from its losses before Judge Rakoff and 
strengthened the enforceability of the PDAA so that courts will dismiss future rider class 
actions and send individual plaintiffs to arbitration. 
IV. CLASS ACTIONS BY DRIVERS 
Uber’s use of a PDAA in its agreements with drivers differs in several respects from 
its use of one with riders. In July 2013, and just after the Supreme Court’s Italian Colors 
ruling, Uber inserted a PDAA in its agreements with drivers that was similar but not 
identical to the rider PDAA Uber first utilized a few months earlier.84 The driver PDAA 
required all disputes “to be resolved only by an arbitrator through final and binding 
arbitration and not by way of court or jury trial.”85 Unlike the rider PDAA, the driver PDAA 
contained a delegation provision and a waiver under California’s Private Attorney General 
Act (PAGA).86 Like the rider PDAA, the driver PDAA contained class and collective 
                                                 
79 Meyer, 200 F. Supp. 3d at 418. 
80 Id.  
81 Id. at 420. Uber has appealed the Meyer decision.  At the time of publication of this article, that appeal was 
pending. This author joined an amicus brief filed by a group of Law Professors in that appeal arguing for 
affirmance. 
82 Uber’s clause effective Nov. 21, 2016 is available at  https://www.uber.com/legal/terms/us/. The clause it 
replaced (Jan. 2, 2016 version) is available at https://www.uber.com/legal/other/US-terms-pre-Nov-2016/. 
83 Screenshots from both phones on file with author. 
84 By the end of 2012, like for riders, Uber faced a driver class action in Massachusetts state court over Uber’s 
gratuity policy. See Lavitman v. Uber Techs., Inc.,  C.A. No. 12–4490, 32 Mass. L. Rptr. 476 (Mass. Super. 
Ct. (Suffolk) Jan. 26, 2015). 
85 O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2014 WL 2215860, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2014). 
86 PAGA authorizes an “aggrieved employee” to “bring a civil action personally and on behalf of other current 
or former employees to recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations.” Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los 
action waivers. Interestingly, the driver PDAA carved out from the general delegation 
provision challenges to those waivers. The PDAA also provided drivers with thirty days to 
opt out of the arbitration provision. However, opting out required drivers to deliver by hand 
or via “a nationally recognized overnight delivery service” to Uber’s general counsel, a 
letter clearly indicating an intent to opt out.87 If drivers did not opt out and continued to use 
the Uber app, they were deemed to have accepted the arbitration agreement.88 
New drivers downloading the app had to click “I agree to the terms and conditions” 
at least twice before the download could complete.  The words “terms and conditions” were 
hyperlinked to a separate page containing the full, multi-page terms and conditions of the 
agreement between Uber and drivers, which contained a warning that it included an 
arbitration provision in bold language at the beginning.89 Similar to riders, a driver had to 
click on a hyperlink to see the actual language of the “[t]erms and [c]onditions” and could 
click on the “I agree” button and become an Uber driver without ever actually viewing the 
language. 
When drivers filed federal class actions against Uber all over the country raising 
various claims,90 Uber quickly moved to compel arbitration in these actions. Virtually all 
district courts that have ruled on Uber’s motion have granted that motion. These courts 
have ruled consistently that drivers assented to the clickwrap agreement containing the 
arbitration clause, the parties clearly and unmistakably delegated gateway arbitrability 
issues to the arbitrator, the delegation clause was not unconscionable, the class action 
waiver did not render the arbitration clause unconscionable, and/or the class action waiver 
did not prevent plaintiffs from effectively vindicating their statutory rights.91 These 
                                                 
Angeles, LLC, 327 P.3d 129, 146 (Cal. 2014) (holding that PAGA waivers violate California public policy 
and FAA does not preempt this California rule). 
87 Lee v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 15 C 11756, 2016 WL 5417215, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2016). 
88 Id. 
89 The warning read: 
PLEASE REVIEW THE ARBITRATION PROVISION SET FORTH BELOW 
CAREFULLY, AS IT WILL REQUIRE YOU TO RESOLVE DISPUTES WITH THE 
COMPANY ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS THROUGH FINAL AND BINDING 
ARBITRATION UNLESS YOU CHOOSE TO OPT OUT OF THE ARBITRATION 
PROVISION.... IF YOU DO NOT WISH TO BE SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION, YOU 
MAY OPT OUT OF THE ARBITRATION PROVISION BY FOLLOWING THE 
INSTRUCTIONS PROVIDED IN THE ARBITRATION PROVISION BELOW. 
Zawada v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-CV-11334, 2016 WL 7439198, at *6-7 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 27, 2016). 
90 See discussion supra Part I, notes 17-23 and accompanying text. 
91 See, e.g., Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 848 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2016); Peng v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 
16CV545PKCRER, 2017 WL 722007 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2017); Guan v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 
16CV598PKCCLP, 2017 WL 744564, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2017); Gunn v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 
116CV01668SEBMJD, 2017 WL 386816, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 27, 2017); Richemond v. Uber Techs., Inc., 
No. 16-CV-23267, 2017 WL 416123, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2017); Cordas v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-
CV-04065-RS, 2017 WL 658847, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2017); Zawada v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-CV-
11334, 2016 WL 7439198, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 27, 2016); Marc v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 
216CV579FTM99MRM, 2016 WL 7210886, (M.D. Fla. Dec. 13, 2016); Congdon v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 
decisions effectively ended the driver class actions and sent drivers across the country to 
arbitration to pursue their claims individually. 
Of these arbitration rulings, only one—Mohamed—issued from a Court of Appeals. 
In November 2014, a putative class of California drivers sued Uber in the Northern District 
of California, alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act stemming from Uber’s 
use of background checks in its hiring and firing decisions.92 After Uber filed motions to 
compel arbitration, Judge Edward Chen rejected plaintiffs’ challenge to the enforceability 
of the PDAA for lack of mutual assent, but ruled that the delegation clause was not clear 
and unmistakable evidence of the parties’ intent to delegate arbitrability decisions to the 
arbitration, and the delegation clause was unconscionable.93 Judge Chen also ruled that the 
PDAA itself was unconscionable.94 
In late 2016, the Ninth Circuit reversed Judge Chen and ruled that the delegation 
clause within Uber’s agreement with drivers was valid and enforceable.95 The Court of 
Appeals found that the delegation clause was unambiguous and that it was a clear and 
unmistakable manifestation of the parties’ intent to delegate arbitrability questions to the 
arbitrator.96 The Court also ruled that the delegation clause was not unconscionable. Thus, 
the Court of Appeals ordered the parties “to arbitrate their dispute over arbitrability.”97 One 
factor that supported the court’s rejection of plaintiffs’ claim that the delegation clause was 
unconscionable was Uber’s commitment to the court that it had agreed to pay all arbitration 
costs of individual claimants.98 
One driver case (improper classification) filed in the Northern District of California 
and also assigned to Judge Chen proceeded along a very different track than most other 
driver class actions.99 Early on in the life of the O’Connor case, instead of focusing on the 
validity of the PDAA, Judge Edward Chen invoked Rule 23(d) of the Federal Rules of 
                                                 
16-CV-02499-YGR, 2016 WL 7157854 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2016); Micheletti v. Uber Techs, Inc., No. CV 
15-1001, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2016 WL 5793799 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2016).  At least seven other courts have 
ruled similarly. 
92 See Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 109 F. Supp. 3d 1185 (N.D. Cal. 2015), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and 
remanded, 836 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2016), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 848 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 
2016). 
93 Id. at 1210, 1216. 
94 Id. at 1217-18. 
95 Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 848 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2016). 
96 Id. at 1208-09. 
97 Id. at 1210-11. The Court did uphold the district court’s ruling that the PAGA waiver was unenforceable, 
but disagreed with the district court that it was severable from the PDAA.  Id. at 1212-14. 
98 Mohamed, 848 F.3d at 1212. 
99 See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-032826-KAW, 2016 WL 6407583 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2013). 
Civil Procedure100 to control communications with class members.101 He concluded that 
Uber’s attempt to send drivers a revised licensing agreement with a PDAA and an opt-out 
clause violated Rule 23(d) because it did not inform drivers of already existing class 
actions, including O’Connor, and the impact any opt-out could have on drivers’ rights to 
participate in those actions.102 
As a result, Judge Chen ordered Uber to revise its arbitration clause with drivers.103 
Specifically, the court required Uber to give clearer notice of the arbitration provision, 
notice of the effect of agreeing to arbitrate on their participation in the O’Connor lawsuit, 
and reasonable means of opting out of the arbitration provision within thirty days of the 
notice. The court also expressly ordered Uber to apply the revised PDAA to past, current 
and future drivers (retrospectively).104  
After a series of efforts by Uber to secure approval from the district court for its 
revised driver PDAA, Judge Chen approved the amended clause in May 2014 with a few 
more important revisions.105 Specifically, Judge Chen ordered: “Uber shall provide in the 
notices and in its Revised Licensing Agreement an email address to which opt out notices 
may be sent and contact information for Plaintiffs’ counsel. The paragraph in the Revised 
Licensing Agreement describing the opt-out procedure should be in bold.”106 The 
following month, Uber distributed the revised PDAA to its drivers nationwide (even to 
drivers who were not part of the O’Connor class action) pursuant to the court’s order.107 
Additional motion practice directed at the PDAA ensued. On December 9, 2015, 
Judge Chen held that the PAGA waiver was unenforceable and nonseverable from the 
arbitration provision; thus, the PDAA was unenforceable.108 The very next day, Uber 
distributed yet another revised PDAA with new opt out language.109 Two weeks later, on 
                                                 
100 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(D).  
101 See O’Connor, 2016 WL 6407583, at *7 (“the promulgation of the Licensing Agreement and its arbitration 
provision, runs a substantial risk of interfering with the rights of Uber drivers under Rule 23”). 
102 Id. at *6-7. The judge seemed particularly perturbed that the opt out did not warn drivers that opting out 
would preclude those drivers from participating in already-pending class actions. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at *7. 
105 See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C–13–3826 EMC, 2014 WL 2215860 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2014). 
106 Id. at *4. 
107 In September 2015, the O’Connor court certified a subclass of drivers, but excluded any driver who 
accepted the Uber contract after June 2014 and did not opt out. 
108 O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 311 F.R.D. 547, 555-56 (N.D. Cal. 2015). This decision preceded the 
Ninth Circuit’s later reversal of Judge Chen’s decision in Mohamed. 
109 O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-CV-03826-EMC, 2016 WL 6997166, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 
2016). Numerous drivers did indeed opt out of this revision, and pursued a class action on behalf of all 
similarly situated opt-out drivers. See Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CV 16-573, 2016 WL 3960556, at *3 
December 23, 2015, Judge Chen enjoined the distribution of that revised PDAA.110 In May 
2016, Judge Chen finally vacated that injunction on the grounds that the parties had 
tentatively settled the lawsuits.111  
In August 2016, Judge Chen rejected the parties’ proposed settlement of the class 
action, and settlement efforts are ongoing.112 However, today, Uber’s nationwide PDAA 
still incorporates Judge Chen’s virtually unprecedented rewriting.  
V. LESSONS 
What lessons can be drawn from Uber’s use of its rider and driver PDAAs and the 
voluminous litigation it generated? Of course, there is the obvious: arbitration clauses 
generate a lot of litigation about arbitration.113  Beyond that, below I share numerous 
observations from my review of Uber’s nationwide attempt to enforce its PDAAs.  
First, good legal advice matters. Assuming Uber inserted arbitration clauses into its 
rider agreements back in 2013 on the advice of lawyers, those lawyers could have given 
better advice. It is well-established law that contracting parties must be on reasonable 
notice of the terms of the contract for a valid contract to be formed. Uber could have 
prevented legal losses, such as those seen in Meyer, if its lawyers had better advised Uber 
how to set up its account creation screens so as to provide users with reasonable notice of 
the terms and conditions governing their contractual relationship. If Uber had designed the 
sign-up screen with the key phrase featured more prominently, in either a larger font or 
highlighted in some manner, the existence of the Terms and Conditions would have been 
more obvious to users and its PDAA would have been more immune to legal challenge. In 
addition, the Uber lawyers could have advised Uber to put the rider PDAA towards the 
very top of the Terms and Conditions as opposed to “burying” it on later pages. Finally, no 
good explanation exists as to why the driver PDAA included a delegation clause but the 
rider PDAA did not. While these revisions might not have stopped users from opposing a 
motion to compel arbitration, they might have led to a court granting Uber’s motion more 
easily and quickly.  
On the other hand, Uber’s inclusion of a delegation clause in its driver PDAA 
protected its preference for arbitration as a dispute resolution method. By inserting a 
delegation provision within a PDAA, companies can ensure that threshold questions of 
                                                 
(E.D. Pa. July 21, 2016) (denying motion to compel arbitration of Philadelphia-based UberBLACK drivers’ 
claims because plaintiffs had opted out of Uber’s arbitration agreement). 
110 O'Connor, 2016 WL 6997166, at *1. 
111 Id.  
112 See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-CV-03826-EMC, 2016 WL  4398271 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 
2016). At the time of publication, O’Connor was still pending.  
113 See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Assault on Judicial Deference, 23 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 417, 418 (2012) 
(lamenting that “the litigious spirit [has] invaded the arbitration process”). 
arbitrability will be heard by an arbitration panel, not a court.114 Unless a reluctant party 
directly challenges the enforceability of the delegation provision itself, arbitrability 
questions will be routed directly to court, effectively cutting off the reluctant party from 
even a threshold review by a court of the validity of the underlying contracts, including the 
arbitration agreement.   
Similarly, Uber’s use of an opt-out provision when it first distributed its PDAA to 
drivers almost single-handedly ensured that a court could not find the PDAA 
unconscionable, again preserving arbitration as Uber’s preferred dispute resolution 
mechanism. Since unconscionability requires both procedural and substantive 
unfairness,115 offering users the opportunity to opt out of the arbitration requirement, 
assuming it is a meaningful opportunity and the terms are not hidden, removes any hint of 
procedural unfairness.116  It is not a “take it or leave it” adhesive contract; it is a “take it or 
opt out” contract. Uber’s lawyers wisely advised it to provide an opt-out.  
 Second, despite concerns that the Supreme Court has eliminated the ability of the 
weaker party to a bargain to void forced arbitration clauses through its twenty-first century 
FAA jurisprudence,117 parties reluctant to arbitrate still might be able to successfully 
challenge their enforceability. Both Uber drivers and riders have been able to avoid 
arbitration of their disputes with Uber in certain factual circumstances on grounds such as 
lack of mutual assent and unconscionability. Thus, the savings clause is doing what 
Congress designed it to do nearly a hundred years ago: preserving state law grounds for 
the revocation of any contract as valid grounds to challenge arbitration contracts.118 This 
ensures that any party reluctant to arbitrate can have a court hear a good-faith argument 
that it never entered into an agreement of any kind with the party seeking arbitration. 
Third, judges’ framing matters. Judge Rakoff framed his opinion in Meyer around 
the Seventh Amendment to support the outcome and in sharp distinction to Judge 
Woodlock’s framing of his decision in Cullinane around the Supreme Court’s FAA 
decisions. This difference in framing can be attributed, at least in part, to Judge Rakoff’s 
well-documented history of judicial activism.119 While it remains to be seen if the Second 
Circuit will overturn Judge Rakoff’s opinion in Meyer, for now at least, Uber passengers 
are not bound by the arbitration clause for the same reason that legions of consumers have 
not been bound by print clauses: they could not have agreed to the clause if they did not 
have, at a minimum, reasonable notice of the existence of those terms. 
                                                 
114 Rent-A-Center., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 69 (2010). 
115 Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 848 F.3d 1201, 1210 (9th Cir. 2016). 
116 See Brian A. Berkley, Can Opt-Out Provisions Save Arbitration Clauses?, LAW360 (June 8, 2016, 12:49 
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117 See Gross, supra note 35.  
118 See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
119 See Sasha Abramsky, Jed Rakoff and the Lonely Fight for Wall Street Justice, THE NATION (June 18, 
2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/jed-rakoff-and-lonely-fight-wall-street-justice/ (last visited Feb. 
26, 2017). 
Fourth, Uber successfully used a class action waiver to avoid dozens of costly rider 
and driver class actions nationwide. Since Concepcion, courts routinely reject 
unconscionability challenges to class action waivers. Including a class action waiver kept 
many consumer and employee claims that have no meaningful value absent numerosity 
from ever being brought. Thus, because some claims will never be brought as economically 
unfeasible, the class action waiver validly immunized Uber from liability on millions of 
dollars of otherwise viable claims.120   
Fifth, in invoking Rule 23(d), Judge Chen in O’Connor found an underutilized tool 
in his judicial toolbox to regulate the content of Uber’s arbitration clause; indeed, to rewrite 
it. Generally, neither courts nor regulators have the power to order a company to use 
particular words or phrases in its arbitration contracts.121 However, the O’Connor decisions 
provide significant precedent supporting a federal district court’s use of FRCP 23(d) 
powers to mandate that companies inserting or revising a PDAA in agreements with 
putative class members include certain phrases and language to ensure they have been 
notified of the impact of an arbitration clause on their legal rights and remedies.122 This 
unusual use of Rule 23(d)—though not unprecedented123— remains unexplored in the 
arbitration literature to my knowledge. Though beyond the scope of this article, further 
analysis of Rule 23(d)’s impact on the content of arbitration clauses is needed.  
Sixth, several federal court Uber decisions illustrate the dialogue that judges often 
have with each other regarding their interpretation and use of precedent. Numerous federal 
judges explicitly referenced the results of Uber cases in other federal districts when ruling 
on the Uber case before them.124 Since so many district court judges have had occasion to 
                                                 
120 See supra note 4. 
121 One exception is in the securities industry, where the Securities and Exchange Commission has approved 
a securities self-regulatory organization’s rule requiring very specific language in its member brokerage 
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124 E.g., Peng v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16CV545PKCRER, 2017 WL 722007, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 
2017) (“Most, if not all, of the other courts to have addressed the same issue similarly have concluded that 
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unconscionability”); Guan v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16CV598PKCCLP, 2017 WL 744564, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 23, 2017) (“Other courts interpreting Uber Services Agreements containing identical or nearly identical 
Class Action Waiver or PAGA carve-out provisions have uniformly upheld delegation of arbitrability 
questions”); Zawada v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-CV-11334, 2016 WL 7439198, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 27, 
2016) (“The Ninth Circuit's conclusion—that the delegation provision properly delegated questions of 
arbitrability to an arbitrator—is consistent with every other district court to reach the issue when examining 
the same or substantially similar Raiser agreements since Mohamed”). 
interpret the same Uber PDAA, if one finds unenforceable what another judge found 
enforceable, that judge might take particular care in justifying the different outcome 
without criticizing it. This might explain Judge Rakoff’s careful distinction in Meyer of 
Judge Woodlock’s opinion in Cullinane, since they both evaluated whether plaintiffs had 
formed a valid contract with Uber through the exact same account creation process. Also, 
when Judge Woodlock stated “[i]t is not within the writ of the lower courts to replot the 
contours of arbitration law when the metes and bounds have been set clearly, 
unambiguously and recently by the Supreme Court,”125 he spoke directly to other federal 
judges who agree that the lower courts are hamstrung by the Supreme Court’s broad 
interpretation of the FAA.126  
Finally, Uber’s rapid and worldwide development of a cheaper and more efficient 
yet controversial mode of transportation parallels the growth in companies’ use of “forced” 
arbitration clauses to facilitate a cheaper and more efficient yet controversial mode of 
resolving disputes. Uberization is emblematic of society’s move towards more efficient 
and less expensive methods of solving problems. Uber solves the transportation problem 
by efficiently and cheaply matching riders and drivers. Taxis, often given a monopoly in 
some cities through regulation of taxi licenses, sometimes charge exorbitant prices and rely 
on outmoded technology (telephone calls or email requests) to locate passengers.   
Similarly, Uber solved its dispute resolution problem by opting out of the inefficient 
and expensive litigation system in this country and selecting a more efficient and cheaper 
dispute resolution mechanism that best suited its needs. Values of process pluralism127 and 
contracting autonomy outweighed those of the right to a jury trial and governmental 
limitation on parties’ freedom of contract. Through its own dispute resolution choices, 
Uber symbolizes the drive to cheaper and more efficient methods of conducting all types 
of business.   
The plethora of federal court decisions generated by challenges to Uber’s PDAA 
provided Uber with a road map to drafting a bulletproof PDAA. Each iteration of Uber’s 
PDAA – revised in response to Judge Chen’s Rule 23(d) orders or revised as Uber learned 
what courts required to send the dispute to arbitration – reflected Uber’s trial and error 
approach to PDAAs.  Yet, with each trial, Uber’s PDAA came closer to achieving Uber’s 
goal of avoiding litigation and ensuring arbitration of disputes with individual riders and 
drivers.  The resulting clause is a legally effective algorithm to solve the problem of 
economic inefficiencies and high costs stemming from class action litigation.  
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